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THE “ULTIMATE” QUESTION: ARE ULTIMATE 
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS REQUIRED TO SUCCEED ON A 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER SECTION 703(A) OF 




To make a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, courts 
apply the paradigm set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. The 
plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was 
qualified for the job; and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action; 
and that (4) the employer gave better treatment to a similarly situated person 
outside the plaintiff’s protected class. In prong three, the term “adverse 
employment action” is introduced as a requirement. Title VII outlines several 
examples of adverse employment actions, which may include termination, 
demotion with significantly less pay, etc.   
In Burlington Northern v. White, the Court explained that Section 703, 
Title VII’s substantive anti-discrimination provision, sets out to prevent 
injury to employees for “who they are” and prevent harms within the scope 
of employment and the workforce. Burlington further distinguished Section 
703 from Section 704, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, stating that 
Congress intended for the retaliation statute to be broader in order to 
encompass retaliatory conduct taken by employers against employees not 
directly tied to their employment or for harms caused outside the workplace. 
However, this left a gray area for discriminatory actions taken by employers 
within the scope of employment but that are not necessarily reflected in an 
ultimate employment decision, such as a firing, failure to hire, or a demotion 
with a change in pay.  
In February of 2019, Peterson v. Linear Controls Inc. was decided. 
Here, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that there was no 
materially adverse action where black employees were subject to working 
outside in the heat without access to water, while white employees remained 
inside in the air conditioning with access to water. The court reasoned that 
because the employees did not suffer an “ultimate employment decision” 
such as a discharge or change in compensation, the differences in their 
employment conditions were not actionable under Title VII. Other circuits, 
 
* J.D. 2021, Florida International University College of Law 
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however, reason that adverse employment actions include conduct that is 
reasonably likely to impair a reasonable employee’s job performance or 
prospects for advancement or promotion, essentially ridding the term of the 
requirement that an ultimate employment decision be taken in order for a 
disparate treatment claim to be actionable.  
Thus, given the varying interpretations to the adverse employment 
action requirement, the Supreme Court should expand its holding in 
Burlington, where it stated that “ultimate employment decisions” are not 
required for retaliation claims, to encompass disparate treatment cases. This 
would ultimately allow claims to prevail without an absolute showing of a 
failure to hire, failure to grant leave, a discharge, a failure to promote, or a 
decrease in compensation. Rather, moving forward, Title VII should stand 
true to its very words and prohibit a more extensive range of employer 
practices that may affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the moment, we are witnessing a system in which employers may 
subject black employees to drastically different work environments than they 
do white employees and still prevail at trial if no “ultimate employment 
decision” was taken against the black employees.1 For instance, employers 
can get away with placing black employees outside in the heat, with no water 
access, while allowing white employees to remain working inside with air 
conditioning and water, so long as both groups are completing the same job 
duties with the same pay.2 If the black employees choose to bring a disparate 
treatment claim against their employer, depending on what circuit they bring 
 
1 See Peterson v. Linear Controls Inc., 757 F. App’x. 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019). 
2 Id. 
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their claim in, they may not prevail because no “ultimate employment 
decision,” such as a firing, demotion, or a transfer with significantly fewer 
duties, was taken.3 This ignores the fact that most discrimination in the 
workplace today is subtle or masked in discrete forms, rather than the explicit 
discrimination that Title VII first sought to correct. Consequently, employers 
may circumvent liability by subjecting employees of protected classes to 
harsher working conditions without necessarily taking an “ultimate 
employment action.” This has been evidenced by the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Peterson v. Linear Controls, decided in February of 2019, where this exact 
scenario took place.4 The petitioner from Peterson asked the Supreme Court 
to decide whether the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” 
covered by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are 
limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation, and leave.5 
Lamentably, in July 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for writ 
of certiorari after the petitioner, Peterson himself, moved to dismiss the case 
under Supreme Court Rule 46.6 Had the case not been dismissed, the 
Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to ultimately decide this 
pressing issue. If given a similar opportunity in the near future, the Supreme 
Court should find that the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” 
covered by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are 
not limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation, and leave. 
Currently, courts remain split on their interpretations of the “adverse 
employment action” requirement to establish a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment. While several courts follow the premise that a wide array of 
disadvantageous changes in the workplace can constitute adverse 
employment actions,7 other courts, like the Fifth and Third Circuits, strongly 
disagree, interpreting Title VII’s substantive prohibition on discrimination to 
reach only “ultimate employment decisions.”8 Such ultimate employment 
decisions encompass only hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or 
compensating.9 The Supreme Court in Burlington Northern made it clear that 
courts could not apply an “ultimate employment decision” requirement for 
retaliation cases, stating that Congress intended for the retaliation provision 





6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Revised Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 46, Peterson v. Linear 
Controls, Inc., No. 18-1401 (5th Cir. 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-
1401/147114/20200707133208845_Revised%20Rule%2046%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf. 
7 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). 
8 See generally Peterson, 757 F. App’x. at 373. 
9 McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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workplace.10 However, the Court did not expand this holding to encompass 
disparate treatment cases in which adverse employment actions are taken 
within the workplace but may not necessarily appear as a tangible or ultimate 
employment decision. As a result, the Court has left the interpretation of 
“adverse employment actions” and what constitutes the “terms and 
conditions” in relation to those adverse actions up to each circuit.  
The Court should take the next possible opportunity, using cases similar 
to Peterson, to clarify what kinds of employer actions may be considered 
adverse, and expand the “adverse employment action” requirement to 
encompass a wide array of disadvantageous changes in the workplace, rather 
than limit it to ultimate employment decisions. In Burlington, the Court went 
as far as to say that, as a practical matter, not all adverse actions are 
necessarily employment related.11 It differentiated between Title VII’s anti-
discrimination provision, which prohibits discrimination as to “terms and 
conditions of employment,” and Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which 
prohibits “discrimination” but is not limited by the additional phrase “terms 
and conditions of employment.”12   
However, there remains a stringent burden on Title VII plaintiffs 
bringing substantive disparate treatment claims. Using the same logic in 
Burlington, the harmfulness of each adverse employment action should be an 
objective standard that would examine whether a “reasonable employee” 
would view the harm as significant, since only significant, as opposed to 
“trivial” harms, are actionable.13 This way, the context of the alleged adverse 
action must be considered on a case-by-case basis and not automatically 
dismissed if there is no evidence of an ultimate employment decision.14 
Part II of this Comment provides background information regarding 
Title VII, its purpose, and the ways in which it has expanded to meet the 
needs of our changing society. This particular section analyzes the fact that 
Title VII was created to halt the racial discrimination and segregation that 
was pervasive in our nation, and still exists today in many, and newer, forms. 
Afterward, Part II goes on to explain the “adverse employment action” 
requirement in Title VII when establishing a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment. Here, the circuit split is introduced. Part III will discuss Peterson 
in more depth, as well as elaborate on the circuit split in more detail, 
organized by approach. Part IV briefly explains why cases like Peterson 
present the ideal facts for the Supreme Court to resolve the question of 
whether it is necessary to show an “ultimate employment decision” when 
 




14 See id.  
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establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Afterward, Part V of this 
Comment analyzes how the Supreme Court should rule when faced with this 
question presented.  
II. BACKGROUND     
A. The Emergence and Expansion of Title VII  
Since Reconstruction, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the 
first significant civil rights act to come into effect. Title VII was created 
during a time of urgency and unrest, in which racial discrimination and 
segregation were pervasive in our nation. Title VII makes it unlawful to (1) 
“fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify 
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee,15 because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”16 Title VII applies to employers 
in both the private and public sectors that have fifteen or more employees, as 
well as to the federal government, employment agencies, and labor 
organizations.17 
In 1991, amendments to Title VII authorized claims for damages and 
jury trials.18 As a result, employers had no other choice but to abide by this 
legislation, completely changing the face of the American workplace. Since 
1991, Title VII has seen many improvements, encompassing discrimination 
that the authors of Title VII did not originally anticipate the need to include. 
But just as the original authors of Title VII did not anticipate the need to 
 
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000).  
The term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer, except that the 
term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or 
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen 
by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy 
making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional 
or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall 
not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, 
governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a 
foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020). 
17 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/employment/employment-
discrimination/title-vii/ (last updated Apr. 2018). 
18 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 21, 1991), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/civil-rights-act-1991-original-text.  
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include protections for discrimination based on things like disability status, 
pregnancy, or sexual orientation, other groups of individuals with new, 
particularized issues have emerged; the need for Title VII to adapt as 
discrimination in the workplace changes its form is crucial to achieving 
exactly what it seeks to protect: a workplace where individuals are not 
discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-
based status.19 As overt discrimination has become less common, 
unconscious bias20 has grown more prominent amongst employers, and the 
need for clarity on these modern issues is critical.  
Further, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also created the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal agency that 
enforces the laws against job discrimination and harassment. Today, the 
EEOC processes about 80,000 job discrimination complaints and works with 
about 94 state and local agencies that investigate approximately 50,000 
additional job discrimination complaints.21 One vital function of the EEOC 
is to issue “EEOC Guidance” documents. While these guidance documents 
are not binding law, they should be looked upon for clarity concerning the 
law or EEOC policies.22 As discrimination in the workforce has grown 
subtler, the EEOC’s role in clarifying these policies is as important as ever. 
Within these guidelines, the EEOC has in fact included how the “adverse 
action” requirement should generally be interpreted, stating  
The most obvious types of adverse actions are denial of 
promotion, refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, 
suspension, and discharge.23 Other types of adverse actions 
may include work-related threats,24 warnings, reprimands,25 
transfers,26 negative or lowered evaluations,27 transfers to 
less prestigious or desirable work or work locations.28 
 
19 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973).  
20 See Valerie Martinelli, The Truth About Unconscious Bias in the Workplace, TALENT CULTURE 
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://talentculture.com/the-truth-about-unconscious-bias-in-the-workplace/.  
21 What Is the EEOC?, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/aboutwho.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). 
22 EEOC Guidance, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www1.eeoc.gov/guidance/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 25, 2020). 
23 Roberts v. Roadway Express, 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir. 1998).  
24 Planadeball v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 793 F.3d 169 (1st Cir. 2015). 
25 Millea v. Metro-North R.R., 658 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2011). 
26 Kessler v. Westchester Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 209 (2d Cir. 2006). 
27 See, e.g., Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
28 EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-
retaliation-and-related-issues. 
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However, each circuit has still interpreted Title VII’s adverse employment 
action requirement for disparate treatment cases drastically differently. This 
presents a newfound need for more straightforward guidance from the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should grab at the next opportunity to 
further expand Title VII to encompass those it is meant to protect but have 
been overlooked: employees bringing disparate treatment claims that cannot 
necessarily point to an “ultimate employment decision.”  
B. Adverse Employment Actions 
In order for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an adverse 
employment action.29 The dividing line between actionable and non-
actionable conduct—for claims of both retaliation or status-based 
discrimination—concerns the presence, or absence, of an adverse 
employment action.30 To make a prima facie case of disparate treatment 
discrimination, the courts apply the paradigm set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas. The plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) belongs to a protected 
class; (2) was qualified for the job; and (3) was subjected to an adverse 
employment action; and (4) that the employer gave better treatment to a 
similarly-situated person outside the plaintiff’s protected class.31 This 
adverse employment action outlined in the third prong must be something 
more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or alteration of job 
responsibilities.32 Examples of adverse employment actions may include 
termination, demotion with significantly less pay, etc.   
As briefly explained earlier, the adverse employment action requirement 
has been interpreted differently in Title VII’s substantive discrimination 
provision, Section 703,33 and its retaliation provision, Section 704.34 In the 
retaliation context, for instance, the definition of adverse employment action 
is explicitly not limited to discriminatory acts that affect the terms and 
conditions of employment, but rather it covers harms that well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
 
29 See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008); Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 
F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2006); Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2005); Villiarimo v. 
Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, 82 F.3d 578, 
580 (3d Cir. 1996). 
30 MJPOSPIS, What Is an “Adverse Employment Action?”, POSPIS LAW PLLC (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://pospislaw.com/blog/2016/09/06/what-is-an-adverse-employment-action/.  
31 See Davis, 520 F.3d at 1089; Demoret, 451 F.3d at 151; Farrell, 421 F.3d at 613; Villiarimo, 
281 F.3d at 1062; Geraci, 82 F.3d at 580.  
32 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). 
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discrimination.35 This distinction took place after the Supreme Court case 
Burlington Northern v. White.36 In Burlington, the Court focused on the 
linguistic difference between Section 703(a) and Section 704(a), stating that 
the underscored words in 703(a)— “hire,” “discharge,” “compensation, 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” “employment 
opportunities,” and “status as an employee”— “explicitly limited the scope 
of that provision to actions that affected employment or altered the conditions 
of the workplace.”37 The Burlington Court stated that because Congress rid 
the retaliation provision of these words, Congress intended to encompass 
adverse actions not directly related to a plaintiff’s employment, as well as 
harms caused outside the workplace, for retaliation claims.38  
However, while the Supreme Court in Burlington correctly expanded 
Title VII’s reach regarding retaliation claims, it did not necessarily limit the 
disparate treatment claims that can be brought, like many circuits seem to 
believe it has. In other words, yes, Burlington stated that Title VII’s 
substantive discrimination provision is limited to employer actions that affect 
employment or alter the conditions of the workplace; however, nowhere in 
Burlington’s holding does the Court limit disparate treatment claims to only 
“ultimate employment decisions.” Rather, the Burlington Court merely 
recognized that the Courts of Appeals have treated discrimination claims in 
this rigid way and held that retaliation claims should not be treated alike 
because a provision limiting employment-related actions would not deter the 
“many forms that effective retaliation can take.”39 This, however, has left the 
circuits without guidance and has created a circuit split regarding what 
exactly constitutes an “adverse employment action” for substantive 
discrimination claims. 
Some circuits claim to construe the meaning strictly, while others 
construe the term more loosely. For example, in Nakis v. Potter, the court 
explained that there are no bright-line rules for determining which 
employment actions meet the “adverse” threshold.40 There, for example, the 
court held that the denial of plaintiff’s request to retake an Excel class was 
sufficiently “adverse” for plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim, since it 
appeared to “bear on plaintiff’s opportunities for professional growth and 
 
35 See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008); Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 
F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2006); Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2005); Villiarimo v. 
Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, 82 F.3d 578, 
580 (3d Cir. 1996). 
36 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 63. 
39 Id. at 64. 
40 Nakis v. Potter, 422 F. Supp. 2d 398, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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career advancement.”41 In that case then, the court did not require that an 
“ultimate employment decision” be taken against the plaintiff. Several 
circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, follow this interpretation of an adverse 
employment action. For instance, the Judicial Council of California Civil 
Jury Instructions (2017 edition) outline an adverse employment action as 
follows: 
Adverse employment actions are not limited to ultimate 
actions such as termination or demotion. There is an adverse 
employment action if [name of defendant] has taken an 
action or engaged in a course or pattern of conduct that, 
taken as a whole, materially and adversely affected the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of [name of plaintiff]’s 
employment. An adverse employment action includes 
conduct that is reasonably likely to impair a reasonable 
employee’s job performance or prospects for advancement 
or promotion. However, minor or trivial actions or conduct 
that is not reasonably likely to do more than anger or upset 
an employee cannot constitute an adverse employment 
action.42 
Other circuits, however, greatly disagree with the court in Nakis and with the 
Ninth Circuit.43 The Fifth Circuit, for example, stresses the need for an 
employer to take such an “ultimate employment decision” in order for the 
plaintiff to have an actionable claim of discrimination. These circuits claim 
to take a stricter approach, encompassing only hiring, granting leave, 
discharging, promoting, or compensating into their “ultimate employment 
decision” requirement.44  
 
III. PETERSON V. LINEAR AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Requiring an Ultimate Employment Decision 
 The Fifth Circuit’s decisions have consistently limited what counts as 
an “ultimate” decision to only “hiring, granting leave, discharging, 
 
41 Id. 




44 McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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promoting, or compensating.”45 In February of 2019, the Fifth Circuit in 
Peterson v. Linear Controls Inc. stated that the court would construe an 
adverse employment action more “strictly” by looking to see if an “ultimate 
employment decision” was taken. The Fifth Circuit in Peterson ruled that 
where black employees’ job duties were changed to working outside in the 
Louisiana summer heat without access to water, while their white 
counterparts remained inside in the air conditioning, this did not constitute 
an adverse employment action.46 The court reasoned that because the 
employees did not suffer an “ultimate employment decision” such as 
discharge or change in compensation, their differences in work environments 
were not actionable under Title VII.47 
Recently, the plaintiff in the Peterson case petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari, asking the Court: 
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual” with respect to “compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of 
the individual’s race, religion, sex, or other protected status. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Are the “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” covered by Section 703(a)(1) 
limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation, and 
leave?48 
In Peterson, the plaintiff, Mr. Peterson, alleged that even after the black 
employees requested to their white supervisors that they rotate from outside 
to inside among the white and black employees, no action was taken.49 
Further, when black employees attempted to take breaks indoors, including 
indoor water breaks, they were “cursed and yelled at” and ordered back to 
work.50 As a result, Mr. Peterson quit his job and filed a charge with the 
EEOC for employment discrimination.51 Ultimately, Mr. Peterson filed suit, 
and the court held that Mr. Peterson’s race discrimination claim failed “as a 
matter of law” because he had not alleged “any” employment practice that 
violated Title VII.52 The district court noted that binding authority from the 
 
45 Id.  
46 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019). 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 371. 
52 Id. at 374. 
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Fifth Circuit took a “narrow view” of what constitutes prohibited 
discrimination under Section 703(a), explaining that prohibited 
discrimination included only ultimate employment actions such as hiring, 
granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating. On appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed.53 
Section 703(a) prohibits discrimination as to the “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment.”54 The Fifth Circuit, however, stated that while 
the events were “disturbing,” the working conditions that the petitioner was 
subjected to were not against the statute.55 Rather, had the petitioner been 
discharged, denied leave or promotion, or paid differently than his white 
counterparts, only then would he have had an actionable claim under Title 
VII in the Fifth Circuit. 
Similar to the case at bar, the Fifth Circuit has also held that a race 
discrimination claim cannot survive where a black applicant was subject to 
drug testing after a workplace incident, unlike his white counterpart after a 
similar incident.56 The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was that simply being 
subjected to a drug test, without more, would not constitute an “ultimate 
employment decision” because a drug test does not affect an employee’s 
duties, compensation, or benefits.57 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has rejected 
race discrimination claims in which black employees alleged to have been 
subjected to heavier workloads while being denied assistance when 
compared to their counterparts.58 Again, applying its rigid “ultimate 
employment decision,” the Fifth Circuit held that imposing heavier 
workloads that other employees were not subjected to cannot constitute an 
adverse employment action under Title VII.59 
Cases such as Peterson and the rest of the aforementioned Fifth Circuit 
holdings should make one consider the questions: Is this what the substantive 
discrimination provision of Title VII was created to accomplish? Could a 
civil rights act specifically aimed at preventing workplace discrimination 
seek to maintain such a narrow scope, aimed only at remedying “ultimate 
employment actions”? And, is it truly inconceivable that Section 703(a) 
reaches beyond these tangible forms of discrimination to encompass the form 
 
53 Id. at 376. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2019). 
55 Peterson, 757 F. App’x at 375. 
56 Johnson v. Manpower Prof’l Servs., Inc., 442 F. App’x 977, 983 (5th Cir. 2011). 
57 Id.   
58 See Wesley v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2266-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101476, at 
*6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2008); Ellis v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 426 F. App’x 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2011); 
see also Benningfield v. City of Hous., 157 F.3d 369, 376–77 (5th Cir. 1998). 
59 See Wesley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101476, at *6; Ellis, 426 F. App’x at 296. 
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of discrimination we see most of in today’s age: differential treatment 
masked behind what deceivingly appears as equal footing? 
In its attempt at better refining what constitutes an adverse employment 
action, the Third Circuit asks whether a particular discriminatory act is 
“serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.”60 The Third Circuit has heard a 
case almost identical to Peterson, in which a black employee failed to make 
a prima facie case of race discrimination. In the Third Circuit, a black 
employee brought suit claiming that he was required by his employer to work 
outdoors, regardless of the dangerously high temperatures.61 Quite similarly 
to Peterson, the white counterparts in this Third Circuit case were allowed to 
stop their outdoor work while the black employees continued.62 There, the 
Third Circuit held that the plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case of 
race discrimination because the employer had not acted with respect to the 
plaintiff’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”63 
The Third Circuit even went on to include in its decision that while the court 
did not “doubt Harris’s characterizations of the conditions outside” nor did 
they “minimize the seriousness of any injury that Harris incurred,” they 
nevertheless could not conclude that the plaintiff showed an adverse 
employment action and thus failed to make out a prima facie case of race 
discrimination.64 
The very problem lies in the fact that courts are able to do away with 
these cases with such ease. A court should not be able to recognize the gravity 
of the injury caused on the one hand yet dismiss the claim because a plaintiff 
cannot point to something as tangible, or “ultimate,” as a firing or change in 
pay. Rather, these instances of differential treatment should be analyzed as 
themselves being changes in “employment terms and conditions,” which 
Title VII explicitly allows for. We cannot expect to rid the workplace of all 
forms of discrimination if we do not treat differential treatment that lacks an 
“ultimate employment decision” with the same attention and skepticism that 
we do when we see a demotion with a change in pay, a firing, or an 
undesirable transfer. 
 
60 Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 
120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
61 Harris v. AG United States, 687 F. App’x 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2017). 
62 Id. at 168–69. 
63 Id. at 169 (quoting Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
64 Id. at 169. 
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B. Rejecting the Stringent “Ultimate Employment Decision” 
Requirement 
The great majority of the circuits, including the Second, Sixth, Eighth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, have rejected the strict approach that 
requires a plaintiff to show that an employer took an ultimate employment 
decision in order to prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim. Instead, these 
circuits recognize that there are a number of disadvantageous changes that 
can occur in the workplace that can constitute adverse employment actions.  
The Second Circuit has previously stated that “courts must pore over 
each case to determine whether the challenged employment action reaches 
the level of ‘adverse’” because there is no “bright-line rule.”65 Take, for 
instance, the scenario described earlier in which an employee complains that 
he is unfairly overworked in comparison to his counterparts.66 The rigid 
standard utilized in Peterson, or in the Fifth and Third Circuits generally, 
does not allow for a system that recognizes an unfair distribution of work as 
adverse treatment simply because the work is a part of the employees’ “job 
duties” or job description.67 In fact, the defendants in Peterson explicitly 
argued that Mr. Peterson’s allegations did not implicate the “terms, 
conditions, or privileges” of his employment because working outdoors was 
part of his job description.68 The Second Circuit, however, has rejected these 
inflexible standards, holding that “performance of normal job duties can 
amount to an adverse employment action if they are divvied between co-
workers in a discriminatory fashion.”69 The Second Circuit has explained that 
a “[d]isproportionately heavy workload could perhaps be an adverse action, 
if the additional work significantly changed the employee’s responsibilities 
so as to diminish that worker’s role or status, or exposed the worker to 
dangerous or extreme conditions not appropriate to her job classification.”70 
In these previous holdings, the Second Circuit has referred to the showing of 
an adverse action in order to make a prima facie case of discrimination as a 
“low threshold.”71  
 
65 Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir. 1997). 
66 See Wesley v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2266-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101476, at 
*6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2008); Ellis v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 426 F. App’x 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2011); 
see also Benningfield v. City of Hous., 157 F.3d 369, 376–77 (5th Cir. 1998). 
67 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019). 
68 Id. 
69 Lopez v. Flight Servs. & Sys., 881 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441 (W.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Young v. 
Rogers & Wells LLP, No. 00-Civ-8019(GEL), 2002 WL 31496205, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 06, 2002). 
70 Young, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21541, at *5.  
71 Id.  
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Likewise, the Sixth Circuit is not concerned with whether an employer 
has taken an ultimate employment decision, such as a firing.72 The Sixth 
Circuit has explained that while Burlington’s holding went great lengths to 
distinguish Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision with its retaliation 
provision, it did not alter the Sixth Circuit’s initial understanding of the 
adverse employment action requirement in Section 703.73 The Sixth Circuit 
has defined an adverse employment action: 
[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of 
employment must be more disruptive than a mere 
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A 
materially adverse change might be indicated by a 
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a 
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a 
material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material 
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a 
particular situation.74 
The Sixth Circuit fully rejects the notion that only ultimate employment 
decisions can be materially adverse, both for the purposes of retaliation 
claims as well as discrimination claims,75 expanding its reach to allow for 
unique and particular situations to be heard,76 rather than quickly discarded 
at summary judgment.  
The Seventh Circuit has divided the kinds of cases in which adverse 
employment actions appear into three groups: 
1. Cases in which the employee’s compensation . . . benefits, 
or other financial terms of employment are diminished, 
including . . . termination of employment.77 
2. Cases in which a nominally lateral transfer with no change 
in financial terms significantly reduces the employee’s 
career prospects by preventing him from using the skills in 
which he is trained and experienced, so that the skills are 
likely to atrophy, and his career is likely to be stunted.78  
3. Cases in which the employee is not moved to a different 
job or the skill requirements of his present job altered, but 
the conditions in which he works are changed in a way that 
 
72 Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2007). 
73 Id.  
74 Ford v. GMC, 305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2002).  
75 Michael, 496 F.3d at 594; Ford, 305 F.3d at 553.  
76 Ford, 305 F.3d at 53. 
77 See, e.g., Simpson v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc. 196 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1999).  
78 See, e.g., Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456–57 (7th Cir. 1994).  
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subjects him to a humiliating, degrading, unsafe, 
unhealthful, or otherwise significantly negative alteration in 
his workplace environment—an alteration that can fairly be 
characterized as objectively creating a hardship, the classic 
case being that of the employee whose desk is moved into a 
closet.79 
The third category of cases identified by the Seventh Circuit allows for an 
employee, like the plaintiff in Peterson, to bring a discrimination claim 
against their employer when they are being subjected to unsafe, or otherwise 
negative, conditions in their workplace,80 without having to necessarily face 
a tangible change in the status of their job. This approach focuses on the 
conditions of the workplace that the employee in a protected class is being 
subjected to when compared to the rest of the employees not in that protected 
class. In 2004, the Seventh Circuit held that a group of black employees 
suffered an adverse employment action when their employer changed their 
job assignments to working outdoors for the majority of their time.81 The 
court specified that the plaintiffs were subjected to harsher working 
conditions, which was in fact an adverse employment action.82  
The Eighth83 and Ninth Circuits follow the same line of reasoning and 
reject the Fifth and Third Circuits’ holdings. The Ninth Circuit, in reference 
to the Supreme Court case of Oncale, has elaborated on the fact that Title VII 
reaches beyond “terms and conditions” in the contractual sense and “evinces 
a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
. . . in employment.”84 Most memorably, the Ninth Circuit has compared the 
requirement of showing an ultimate employment decision to that of the 
rationale behind “separate but equal.”85 The Ninth Circuit brought this 
comparison in 2011, when the court found that a group of black employees 
did in fact establish an adverse action when they were assigned to different 
workplaces than their white counterparts.86 The Ninth Circuit stated that the 
defendants’ contention that “segregation, without more, does not constitute 
an adverse employment action” is “reminiscent of a ‘separate but equal’ 
 
79 Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002). 
80 Id. 
81 Tart v. Ill. Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 475 (7th Cir. 2004). 
82 Id. 
83 See, e.g., Wedow v. City of Kan. City, 442 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2006). 
84 Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)).  
85 DeWeese v. Cascade Gen. Shipyard, Civil No. 08-860-JE, 2011 WL 3298421, at *10–*11 (D. 
Or. May 9, 2011). 
86 Id. 
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model of racial equality that federal courts have long rejected.”87 Under the 
Ninth Circuit’s broader standard, “a wide array of disadvantageous changes 
in the workplace [may] constitute adverse employment actions.”88 
Essentially, under this approach, an employer cannot escape liability by 
masking a segregated workplace behind what deceptively looks like equal 
job opportunities. In other words, an employer may be paying all employees 
equally and assigning the same kinds of tasks, but at the same time, that 
employer could exclusively subject a group of minority employees to harsher 
working conditions, like those in Peterson, while allowing members outside 
of that protected class to work in bearable conditions. The Ninth Circuit’s 
expansive approach saves itself from falling into a system that cannot fathom 
that this sort of discrimination exists and has permeated today’s workplace.  
Under this same kind of expansive approach, the Tenth89 and Eleventh 
Circuits have avoided adopting a stringent rule, opting to examine “the 
unique factors relevant to the situation at hand.”90 The Eleventh Circuit has 
stated, for instance, that reassigning employees to new job duties, regardless 
of whether the change still remained a part of the job’s description, would in 
fact constitute an actionable claim for discrimination if the plaintiff could 
show that the job reassignment constituted a loss of prestige and 
responsibility.91 
C. The Undecided 
The remaining circuits have not taken sides on the circuit split and have 
not adopted their own uniform system for interpreting adverse employment 
actions. The Fourth Circuit, however, has found that reducing a current 
employee’s voluntary overtime opportunities, regardless of whether there 
was a reduction in overall income, could be considered an adverse 
employment action.92 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not rule on whether 
every situation involving a reduction in voluntary overtime would be an 
adverse employment action, but rather, it is up for a jury to decide.93  
 
87 Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
88 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Delacruz v. Tripler Army Med., 507 F. 
Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (D. Haw. 2007); Lewis v. UPS, No. C 05-02820 WHA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23488, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2005). 
89 Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998); Barone v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 355 F. App’x 169, 181 (10th Cir. 2009). 
90 See Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532; Barone, 355 Fed. Appx. at 181; Hinson v. Clinch Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Dekalb Cty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
91 See Doe, 145 F.3d at 1448; Hinson, 231 F.3d at 830.  
92 See e.g., Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 909 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2018). 
93 Id. 
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Lastly, when deciding cases involving lateral transfers, the D.C. Circuit 
has stuck to the idea that a lateral transfer is not an adverse employment 
action where it does not result in material changes in the “terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment.”94 However, the D.C. Circuit has opined that 
where the purpose of the transfer would be to escape a racially-biased 
supervisor who could negatively impact the employee’s career advancement, 
such transfer would represent a change in the “terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment.”95 
Interestingly enough, Justice Kavanaugh, then a D.C. Circuit judge, 
gave a particularly pro-employee concurring opinion in the case of Ortiz-
Diaz.96 In Ortiz, the court found that discriminatory transfers are sometimes 
actionable, including under the circumstances alleged in this specific case 
involving a racially biased supervisor. Judge Kavanaugh, however, wrote in 
his concurring opinion: 
Uncertainty will remain about the line separating transfers 
actionable under Title VII from those that are not actionable. 
In my view, the en banc Court at some point should go 
further and definitely establish the following clear principle: 
All discriminatory transfers (and discriminatory denials of 
requested transfers) are actionable under Title VII. As I see 
it, transferring an employee because of the employee’s race 
(or denying an employee’s requested transfer because of the 
employee’s race) plainly constitutes discrimination with 
respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment” in violation of Title VII.97 
Although characterized as a conservative judge, here, Kavanaugh 
expressed a view many would hold as pro-employee. This observation sparks 
a new thought: how would, and of course, how should the Supreme Court 
rule on this issue, given the nature of the current bench? Primarily, three of 
the Supreme Court justices are currently classified as “left-leaning,” which 
typically hold a pro-employee ideology. However, given Justice 
Kavanaugh’s strong stance on employee transfers, it is possible that future 
plaintiffs who find themselves in a position similar to Peterson could succeed 
on a racial discrimination claim, using the right arguments.  
 
94 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-1 (excluding Pub. L. No. 116-
283 and 116-315)). 
95 Ortiz-Diaz v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Office of Inspector Gen., 867 F.3d 
70, 81 (2016). 
96 Id. 
97 Id.  
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IV. IT IS TIME TO DECIDE THIS ISSUE 
Currently, the Supreme Court has ruled on what constitutes an “adverse 
employment action” in the context of retaliatory discrimination.98 In 
Burlington Northern, the plaintiff brought charges against her employer for 
assigning her to less desirable duties after she complained of sexual 
harassment.99 The lower court found that this did not constitute an adverse 
employment action for purposes of Title VII because she was not fired, 
demoted, denied a promotion, or denied wages.100 When brought before the 
Supreme Court, the Court found that though the duties were within the same 
classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was 
nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination.101 
After Burlington Northern, it was made clear that courts could not apply an 
“ultimate employment decision” requirement to retaliation cases.102 The 
Supreme Court, however, has failed to give clearer guidance on the meaning 
of “adverse employment actions” when it comes to disparate treatment cases 
or when it comes to analyzing discriminatory acts generally. The varying 
interpretations of each circuit illustrate the drastic need for a more concrete 
understanding. 
The Supreme Court, on October 19, 2019, invited the Solicitor General 
to file a brief in the Peterson case to express the views of the United States.103 
Oftentimes, this is an indication that the Court is interested in hearing the 
case.104 In fact, studies have indicated a petition is over thirty-seven times 
more likely to be granted following a call for the views of the Solicitor 
General.105 As of March 20, 2020,106 the Solicitor General filed his brief in 
which he indicated that the Court should grant certiorari in the Peterson case 
because the United States has a substantial interest in the Court’s resolution 
of the question presented.107 The Solicitor General went on to fortify that the 
Fifth Circuit was incorrect in holding that Section 703(a)(1) prohibits 
 
98 See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  
99 Id. at 58.  
100 Id. at 59.  
101 Id. at 71.  
102 Id. at 67.  
103 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., SCOTUS BLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/peterson-v-linear-controls-inc/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).  
104 David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court 
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 273 (2009).   
105 Id.   
106 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., supra note 103. 
107 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370, 
373 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1401). 
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discrimination only in “ultimate employment decisions,” stating that this 
requirement has no foundation in Title VII’s text, Congress’s purpose, or the 
Court’s precedents.108 
According to EEOC statistics, between the years 2010 and 2019, the 
EEOC had received between 15,000 and 19,000 Title VII charges alleging 
discrimination as to the terms or conditions of employment;109 this represents 
more than a quarter of Title VII cases the EEOC receives in a fiscal year.110 
Proper guidance from the Court regarding the interpretation of Section 703(a) 
would thus greatly impact employment discrimination litigation, as this is a 
recurring issue in Title VII claims.111 
Peterson had presented itself as the ideal case to settle the proper 
interpretation of Section 703 and whether it prohibits discrimination only in 
ultimate employment decisions. As the Solicitor General describes Peterson, 
“the facts alleged here present the kind of extreme scenario that would 
typically arise only as a hypothetical to illustrate the flaws in respondent’s 
interpretation of the statute.”112 Unfortunately for anti-discrimination 
plaintiffs, in July 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for writ of 
certiorari after the petitioner, Peterson himself, moved to dismiss the case. 
Without the Court’s guidance, many plaintiffs who find themselves in a 
circuit that takes the restrictive approach of requiring an ultimate 
employment action will be continuously deterred from filing cases; attorneys 
in these circuits are unlikely to pursue cases unless there is an automatic 
showing of an ultimate employment decision. Surely, the Supreme Court has 
a pressing interest in protecting Title VII’s foundational goals and Congress’s 
intent in enacting the legislation; the Court’s interest calls for a need to act 
with urgency in order to prevent discrimination plaintiffs with valid 
segregation claims to be disposed of at summary judgment. Therefore, if 
given a similar opportunity in the near future, the Supreme Court should jump 
at such an opportunity in order to provide guidance to lower courts.  
V. HOW SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT RULE? 
The Supreme Court should find that the “terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment” covered by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
 
108 Id. at 6.  
109 Statutes by Issue (Charges filed with EEOC), FY 2010−FY 2019, EEOC, 
https://go.usa.gov/xdBBu (last visited June 22, 2021). 
110 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges (Charges filed with EEOC), FY 1997–FY 
2019, EEOC, https:// go.usa.gov/xdBK3 (last visited June 22, 2021). 
111 Id.  
112 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 
370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1401). 
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Act of 1964 are not limited only to hiring, firing, promotions, compensation, 
and leave. With any question of statutory interpretation, the Court looks to 
the plain language of the statute to derive its intent.113 When discovering a 
statute’s intent or when defining undefined terms within the statute, courts 
look to the usual and ordinary meaning of the statute’s words.114 The relevant 
verbiage in Section 703(a) makes it unlawful for a private employer or a state 
or local government “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”115 In 
application, courts have condensed this provision to the notion that 
employers cannot take “adverse employment actions” because of an 
individual’s protected class.116 In interpreting the plain meaning of the “terms 
and conditions” of employment, it is difficult to imagine that Congress did 
not intend to include the physical conditions of everyday employment such 
as the work location, work assignments, rotation between employees, breaks, 
and everything else that makes up the day-to-day workplace. The term 
“working conditions” is defined as the working environment and all existing 
circumstances affecting labor in the workplace, including job hours, physical 
aspects, legal rights, and responsibilities.117 It would not make sense for Title 
VII’s fundamental goal to be to eradicate all forms of discrimination in the 
workplace but not protect against adverse actions as to the most basic 
component of the workplace: the physical conditions that employees are 
subjected to day in and day out. It cannot be rational to come to the 
conclusion that subjecting black employees to work outside, without access 
to water, when their white counterparts enjoy bearable working conditions, 
does not constitute a term or condition of employment.  
When looking to the statutory text of Section 703(a), it is clear that the 
term “ultimate employment decision” appears nowhere.118 Rather, it reads 
that discrimination as to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” 
is prohibited.119 The Supreme Court in Meritor held that “the phrase ‘terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment’ in Title VII is an expansive concept 
which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working 
 
113 See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).  
114 See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012); Burlington N. & Santa 
Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–64 (2006). 
115 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020). 
116 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)); see also 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
117 Working Condition Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/w/working-condition/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).  
118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020). 
119 Id. 
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environment heavily charged with [discrimination].”120 Consequently, to find 
that Section 703(a) cannot reach the kinds of discriminatory events that 
occurred in Peterson simply does not align with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the statute.121 While Section 703(a) begins by specifying that 
employers cannot “fire, or fail or refuse to hire” an individual based on their 
race, sex, national origin, color, or religion,122 the text continues to state that 
it is unlawful “otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”123 The 
text itself clearly indicates that there is something more that makes up the 
employment practices Title VII aims to prevent—something beyond a harm 
that is easily measured by a financial change.  
Today, much of the discrimination that pervades our workplace, and our 
society, generally, is unconscious or subconscious. At this point, we cannot 
afford to ignore it. Unconscious and subconscious bias, if left unchecked, will 
turn into blatant discrimination.124 These biases can manifest themselves in 
work evaluations, decision-making, and even career advantages if 
preferential treatment is given to only a certain demographic of individuals. 
But less obvious are the kinds of subconscious and unconscious bias that the 
law is hesitant to regulate because it cannot be measured by numbers or a 
paper trail; it is the kind of bias we see in Peterson.125 By rejecting the Fifth 
Circuit’s stringent “ultimate employment action” requirement seen in 
Peterson, the Supreme Court holds the perfect opportunity to regulate these 
subtle forms of discrimination that permeate today’s workplace.  
Laws are meant to adapt in order to form a society that protects the rights 
of every citizen. To find that a situation in which black employees are forced 
to work outside in the summer heat, deprived of air conditioning and water, 
while their white counterparts enjoy such luxuries, is not only irresponsible 
on behalf of the judiciary, but it is reminiscent of a period of time that simply 
did not care about the rights of an entire demographic of people. The 
inconsistencies seen throughout the circuits create an unfair and unbalanced 
system. A plaintiff who would be able to succeed on a discrimination claim 
within the Ninth Circuit126 may not be able to succeed on the same claim by 
virtue of bringing the case in the Fifth Circuit.127 While this is true of every 
circuit split, the issue we see here is extremely problematic for society. 
 
120 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).  
121 See id. 
122 § 2000e-2(a). 
123 Id. 
124 See Martinelli, supra note 20. 
125 Peterson v. Linear Controls, Inc., 757 F. App’x 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2019). 
126 See Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2008). 
127 See, e.g., Peterson, 757 F. App’x at 373. 
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Without a holding from the Supreme Court, courts like the Fifth Circuit will 
continue deciding cases as if Title VII cannot protect employees from 
employers who segregate by subjecting a certain protected class to more 
undesirable working conditions if those conditions are not coupled with an 
ultimate employment decision.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In February of 2019, the Fifth Circuit in Peterson ruled that where black 
employees’ job duties were changed to working outside in the Louisiana 
summer heat without access to water, while their white counterparts 
remained inside in the air conditioning, this did not constitute an adverse 
employment action.128 The court reasoned that because the employees did not 
suffer an “ultimate employment decision” such as discharge or change in 
compensation, their change of duties was not actionable under Title VII.129  
Currently, courts remain split on their interpretations of the “adverse 
employment action” requirement to establish a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment. While several courts follow the premise that a wide array of 
disadvantageous changes in the workplace can constitute adverse 
employment actions,130 other courts, like the Fifth Circuit, strongly disagree, 
interpreting Title VII’s substantive prohibition on discrimination to reach 
only “ultimate employment decisions.”131 These ultimate employment 
decisions encompass only hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or 
compensating.132 
With discrimination changing its form from the blatant discrimination 
Title VII initially was enacted to eradicate, to more subtle and masked forms 
of discrimination, the Supreme Court should expand Title VII’s reach to 
eliminate discrimination as to the physical conditions of the workplace. The 
Supreme Court has previously held that “the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment’ in Title VII is an expansive concept which sweeps 
within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment 
heavily charged with discrimination.”133 To hold that only “ultimate 
employment decisions” fit squarely within Title VII’s reach is contrary to the 




130 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). 
131 See generally Peterson, 757 F. App’x at 373. 
132 McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2007). 
133 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
134 Id.  
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Lastly, the words “ultimate employment decision” appear nowhere in 
Section 703.135 The Supreme Court has been clear that limits on the reach of 
a statute come from the text of the statute itself, not from “add[ing] words to 
the law to produce what is thought to be a desirable result.”136 In fact, limits 
on the scope of Section 703 already exist in that the discrimination must be 
connected to the workplace, and “merely offensive” conduct alone does not 
violate Section 703(a)(1) as that does not sufficiently alter an employee’s job 
conditions.137 As a result, rejecting the stringent “ultimate employment 
decision” requirement would not open the floodgates to baseless or frivolous 
claims, it would simply open the door to plaintiffs with on-the-job racial 
segregation claims.  
 
 
135 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2020). 
136 EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 774 (2015). 
137 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
